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Abstract 
In courts in the United Kingdom, understanding of memory phenomena is often assumed to 
be a matter of common sense.  To test this assumption three hundred and thirty seven UK 
respondents, consisting of 125 Chartered Clinical Psychologists, 88 individuals who 
advertised their services as Hypnotherapists in a classified directory, the Yellow PagesTM, and 
124 first year undergraduate psychology students, completed a questionnaire that assessed 
their knowledge of ten memory phenomena about which there is a broad scientific consensus.  
Hypnotherapists’ responses were the most inconsistent with the scientific consensus, scoring 
lowest on six of these ten items.  Principal Components Analysis indicated two latent 
variables – reflecting beliefs about memory quality and malleability – underlying 
respondents’ responses.  In addition, respondents were asked to rate their own knowledge of 
the academic memory literature in general.  There was no significant relationship between 
participants’ self reported knowledge and their actual knowledge (as measured by their 
responses to the ten-item questionnaire).  There was evidence of beliefs among the 
Hypnotherapists that could give rise to some concern (e.g., that early memories from the first 
year of life are accurately stored and are retrievable). 
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In 2010 the British Psychological Society (BPS) published a document entitled 
‘Guidelines on memory and the law: Recommendations from the scientific study of human 
memory’ (BPS, 2010).  The purpose of that document was to aid decision-making in court by 
providing a rigorously informed understanding of memory science.  However, as Keane 
(2010) notes, little attention has been paid to the report in the legal community because the 
scientific findings are “the same as, or very similar to, commonly held beliefs, common 
experience and common sense” (Keane, 2010, p. 24; but see Howe & Knott, 2015 for a 
counter example).  But, as Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio and Beyerstein (2010) point out, there are 
many examples where scientific evidence refutes (or at least heavily qualifies) commonly 
held beliefs about psychology.  The results of several large-scale surveys suggest that the 
same is also true of commonly held beliefs about memory. 
Simons and Chabris (2011), for example, found that 63% of a representative U.S. 
sample agreed with the statement, ‘Human memory works like a video camera, accurately 
recording the events we see and hear so that we can review and inspect them later,’ and 48% 
agreed with the statement that ‘Once you have experienced an event and formed a memory of 
it, that memory does not change’.  In contrast, a sample of memory experts, including 16 
professors, each of whom had over 10 years of memory research experience, endorsed neither 
of those statements.  Magnussen et al. (2006) surveyed 2000 adult Norwegians regarding 
their beliefs and opinions about human memory.  On some issues (e.g., the date of earliest 
memories), the views of the general public were substantially consistent with the scientific 
literature.  On other issues (e.g., the likelihood of repression of adult traumatic memories), 
their sample expressed beliefs that were largely unsupported by the scientific literature.   
These recent findings accord with earlier surveys of memory beliefs.  For example, 
Loftus and Loftus (1980) conducted an informal survey of 169 individuals (75 of whom had 
formal graduate training in psychology) concerning their beliefs about how memory works.  
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They found that 84% of the psychologists agreed with the statement that “[E]verything we 
learn is permanently stored in the mind, although sometimes particular details are not 
accessible.  With hypnosis, or other special techniques, these inaccessible details could 
eventually be recovered”.   Garry, Loftus, Brown and DuBreuil (1997) found that individuals 
who had participated in a number of memory recovery activities (e.g., participated in 
‘memory work’ with a therapist, or reading books telling them about recovering lost 
memories) were more likely to endorse beliefs about the reliability of prenatal memories, and 
the permanence of memory. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given these widespread beliefs about memory in general, 
research shows that more specialised knowledge about memory science is also not well 
understood by lay people.  In a meta-analysis of 23 surveys assessing lay knowledge of 
eyewitness issues, Desmarais and Read (2011) concluded that findings related to variables 
including the relationship between confidence and accuracy, and the effects of alcohol on 
memory (‘estimator’ variables) were frequently beyond the knowledge of a jury.  Surveys of 
professional groups find that they, too, hold beliefs about memory that are not in accordance 
with scientific findings (see French & Ost, in press; Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld & Loftus, 
2014).  For example, Magnussen et al. (2008) surveyed U.S. and Norwegian judges’ 
knowledge and beliefs about a range of eyewitness issues and found that both groups 
included individuals who had limited knowledge of the scientific findings.  Likewise, a 
survey of 99 judges in Scotland found a large degree of variability in the consistency of their 
views and beliefs with expert opinion in relation to the conceptualisation and understanding 
of memory (Houston, Hope, Memon & Read, 2013).   
Moving away from surveys of legal professionals – who may have had little, if any, 
formal training in memory science – Legault and Laurence (2007) found that 68% of a 
sample of 220 social workers, psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, agreed with the 
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statement that ‘everything one experiences is permanently recorded in one’s brain’ (84% of 
the social workers agreeing with this statement).   Similarly, Magnussen and Melinder’s 
(2012) survey of 858 licensed psychologists in Norway revealed that the average number of 
responses deemed correct given by this sample (63%) was no different from a parallel survey 
of judges (63%) and not much higher than a survey of the general public (56%).  Worryingly, 
Melinder and Magnussen (2014) found that psychologists and psychiatrists who served as 
expert witnesses in court were overall no more accurate in their beliefs about memory than 
those who did not serve as expert witnesses.  It is noted that another recent survey of 
psychiatrists found that a large majority of them endorsed beliefs that were reported to be 
substantially inconsistent with what the authors deemed to be the more generally accepted 
view of the memory literature among academics and experts familiar with the subject (e.g., 
that “blocked memories” can result in physical symptoms like non-epileptic seizures; Kemp, 
Spilling, Hughes & de Pauw, 2013).   
Evidence consistently indicates that the public (and thereby potential jurors) as well as 
many professional groups (including those acting as investigators, witnesses to fact, and triers 
of fact) often hold beliefs about memory that are not in accord with the scientific literature.  
Based on this evidence some argue that expert testimony may be required to inform decision-
making at court (e.g., Howe, 2013).  Yet there is resistance to admitting evidence from expert 
witnesses on memory in court proceedings.  A judgment in the UK Royal Courts of Appeal 
exemplifies this.  In R v Jonathan CWS (2006) the judges refused to admit expert testimony, 
arguing that some of the points made about the inherent unreliability of memory (“the 
memories of adults, going back into their childhood, could often be wrong”) were simply 
“unremarkable” (paragraph 18).  While Howe (2013) shares the goal of fewer memory 
researchers being called as expert witnesses to aid the jury, he nevertheless argues that it is 
unlikely, cautioning that until, “scientific knowledge becomes … familiar to triers of fact 
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(judges, jurors), police, and laypeople, memory experts will continue to be an inexorable part 
of the legal process when memory serves as the main or only evidence” (p. 576; see also 
Conway, 2013; Zajac, Garry, London, Goodyear-Smith & Hayne, 2013).  
In summary, the results of surveys of the general public and professionals (including 
qualified practitioner psychologists) indicate that many people hold beliefs about memory 
that would be viewed with concern by most academics involved in memory research.  One 
limitation with the existing literature is that it generally focuses on accredited or registered 
therapists, thus ignoring lay or “unqualified therapists” (Memon, 1995, p. 156; Weiskrantz, 
1995; but see Patihis et al., 2014).  The beliefs about memory held by unchartered therapists 
are important to gauge for at least two reasons. Firstly, such an individual may be someone to 
whom an individual may be referred for psychological counselling and – thus – may be 
instrumental in guiding a client toward an understanding of his or her memories (or lack of 
them).  Secondly, although an unchartered therapist would not be called as an expert witness 
in relation to memory evidence (i.e., to give opinion evidence), they might well be called as a 
witness of fact (i.e., to give evidence before a jury about what a client could or could not 
recall at a given time during treatment).   The only authors to date that have compared 
memory beliefs of research-oriented psychologists to clinicians and laypersons are Patihis et 
al. (2014).  In that paper (Study 2) they found evidence of a substantial disparity in beliefs 
about memory between memory scientists and psychological practitioners (Clinical 
Psychologists, NLP therapists) relating to issues like the repression of traumatic memories 
(less than 30% of research-oriented psychologists agreed that ‘traumatic memories are often 
repressed,’ compared to 60% of respondents in their other participant groups).  An 
exploratory factor analysis of their data revealed one key factor that Patihis et al. (2014) 
summarized as ‘belief in repressed memory or memory reliability’ on which clinical-
psychology practitioners scored significantly higher than clinical psychology researchers. 
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To date, comparable data for UK clinicians is insufficient.  It is important to obtain 
such comparative data because, in North America particularly, there has been intense legal 
scrutiny of memory science as a result of high profile court cases involving ‘repressed’ or 
‘recovered’ memories (see for example, Loftus, 1998).  Thus it is possible that, as a result of 
the publicity and debate surrounding such cases, the research findings concerning memory 
have been debated more widely in the psychological community in North America than 
elsewhere.    
In the interests of full disclosure we note that the data reported in the present paper 
were collected some years ago (between 2007 and 2009), but not published, as part of a 
separate project (see Ost, Wright, Easton, Hope & French, 2013).  We were prompted to 
revisit these unpublished data by the rise in the UK in the number of reports of cases 
involving ‘historic’ or ‘non-recent’ allegations of abuse.  That increase has been partly driven 
by successful prosecutions in several recent high profile cases (e.g., R v. Frank Maxwell 
Clifford, 2014; Office for National Statistics, 2013).  Beliefs about memory stability or 
malleability are, of course, central to such cases.  The memory beliefs of UK psychology 
practitioners may be particularly important to report, as they are people to whom initial 
disclosures of sexual assault may be made – sometimes many years after the alleged events 
occurred – before being reported to the police.   
We surveyed the beliefs of two groups of practitioners (Chartered Clinical 
Psychologists and unchartered therapists), and first year undergraduate psychology students 
in the United Kingdom.  For the purposes of this study, the unchartered sample consisted of 
Hypnotherapists who advertised their services in a classified directory, the Yellow Pages™.  
Hypnotherapists were selected for several reasons.  Firstly, hypnosis was widely advocated 
during the 1980s and 1990s as a technique that could enable the recovery of forgotten 
memories of abuse (e.g., Poole, Lindsay, Memon & Bull, 1995), despite evidence that this 
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was not the case and that, in fact, its use might increase the likelihood of false memories 
(Pintar & Lynn, 2008).  Secondly, as Rook and Ward (2010, p. 887) – widely acknowledged 
legal authorities on sexual offence case law – note, it is “not unknown for allegations of 
sexual assaults, particularly in childhood, to be made following such [hypnotherapy] 
treatment”.  Finally, while advertising one’s services as a Hypnotherapist in the Yellow 
Pages™ does not mean one is unqualified, it is assumed here that the majority of these 
individuals would have a different background with respect to training and engagement with 
more formal routes and accreditation processes from that of Chartered Clinical Psychologists.  
The undergraduate sample was included to serve as a comparison group who may have more 
knowledge of psychology than a member of the general public (by virtue of relevant pre-
university education) but have not been exposed to the psychology degree programme and 
would be, at that point in their careers, untrained for professional practice. 
Method 
Memory Beliefs Questionnaire (MBQ) 
A Memory Beliefs Questionnaire (MBQ) was the final section of a larger 
questionnaire that was designed to gather data about respondents’ beliefs and practices about 
recovered memory.  The first section was entitled ‘You and your practice’ and respondents 
were asked to record demographic information, including their gender, their age bracket (21-
30yrs; 31-40yrs; 41-50yrs; 51-60yrs; 61-70yrs; 71+), and how many years of post-
qualification practice they had (0-10yrs, 11-20 yrs, 21-30 yrs, 31+ yrs).  The second section 
was entitled ‘Your clients’ memories of childhood sexual abuse’.  The data from this part of 
the questionnaire are reported in Ost et al., (2013).  The final part of the questionnaire 
consisted of the MBQ, and is detailed below.  Note that the Undergraduate sample completed 
only the MBQ questions as a pen and paper exercise at the start of their first introductory 
lecture at University.  
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The MBQ contained 11 statements about memory.  Six of these items were either 
taken directly or in a slightly adapted form from Yapko’s (1994) survey (e.g., “The more 
confidence [certainty in the original] with which a memory is reported, the more likely it is to 
be accurate”1).  The remaining five items were devised based on established research 
findings, specifically that emotional content does not reliably indicate memory accuracy (e.g., 
Laney & Loftus, 2008), that it is not possible to reliably distinguish between true and false 
memories, (see Bernstein & Loftus, 2009), that the vividness of a memory is not diagnostic of 
its accuracy (e.g., Talarico & Rubin, 2003), that it is possible for an individual to develop 
‘false’ memories of non-traumatic events (e.g., Hyman, Husband & Billings, 1995), and that 
it is possible for an individual to develop ‘false’ memories of traumatic events (e.g., Porter, 
Yuille & Lehman, 1999) 2. As these last two statements were very similar (the first asking 
about the possibility that someone could falsely remember non-traumatic events and the 
second asking about the possibility that someone could falsely remember traumatic events) 
and were both moderately correlated (Pearson’s r = .44, p < .005) the more contentious 
statement (i.e., false memory for traumatic events) was omitted from the calculation of the 
final scale.   
The remaining ten statements comprised those about which a broad scientific 
consensus exists (see Table 1). Respondents were asked to indicate on a four-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree) their endorsement of each statement. The internal consistency of these ten 
memory statements was reasonable (Cronbach’s alpha = .73).  A ‘don’t know’ option was not 
considered appropriate given that two of the three target populations would be expected to 
                                                                 
1
 But see Wixted et al., (2015) for new evidence on the link between initial confidence in the absence of 
contamination and accuracy in line-up identifications. 
2
 The original questionnaire consisted of these eleven items tapping beliefs about memory, and another further 
set of items concerning beliefs about hypnosis , trauma and treatment (taken from Yapko, 1994 and West, Easton 
& Fellows, 1997).  As it did not seem reasonable to expect undergraduate psychology studen ts to have 
knowledge of the research literature on hypnosis , trauma or treatment, these items were not included in the 
undergraduate questionnaire, and the responses of the Clinical Psychologists and Hypnotherapists to these items 
were excluded from the analyses reported here. 
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have knowledge of memory science given either their training (Clinical / Licensed 
Psychologists) or that they were advertising their professional services as therapists 
(Hypnotherapists).  One item was positively phrased (such that an agree response was more 
in line with the scientific consensus), and the remaining nine were negatively keyed.  To aid 
interpretation, the scores from nine of the ten items were subsequently reversed so that a 
higher score represented a response that was in line with the broad scientific consensus (the 
tenth item was already scored in that direction).  These were then summed to produce a score 
between ten and 40 for each participant where a higher score meant that they had given 
responses to the ten items that were in line with the broad scientific consensus. 
The final item on the MBQ asked respondents to rate their overall knowledge of the 
memory literature by responding to the following question: What best describes your 
knowledge of the memory research literature relating to the long-term recall of trauma?  
This question was taken from Yapko (1994) and adapted slightly so that the response options 
were qualified.  The response options were:  ‘Below average’ qualified with ‘(e.g., I rarely 
read relevant journal articles)’; ‘Average’ qualified with ‘(e.g., I occasionally read relevant 
journal articles)’; and ‘Above average’ qualified with (e.g., I regularly read relevant journal 
articles)’.  For the purposes of analysis, responses were assigned values of one (below 
average), two (average) and three (above average). 
Respondents and sampling procedure (original survey) 
The sampling procedure and response rates for the original survey are included below.  
This is followed by the demographics for only those respondents who responded to all of the 
MBQ items as well as the ‘knowledge of the memory literature’.   
Chartered Clinical Psychologists (CCP): This sample consisted of members of the 
British Psychological Society Division of Clinical Psychology, membership of which 
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requires Chartered Clinical Psychologist status.  Members of the Division were targeted using 
two methods.  The first was via a full-page advert placed in a monthly publication (Clinical 
Psychology Forum) sent to all members of the Division of Clinical Psychology.  Three 
adverts were placed in three consecutive issues (December 2007 through February 2008) 
containing a short statement of the aims of the research, a website for participants to access 
and complete the online questionnaire, and details of a prize draw.  The exact wording of the 
advert was as follows: 
“We have developed an online survey to obtain data on professional psychologists’ 
experiences, beliefs and practices regarding working with adult survivors of 
childhood sexual abuse.” 
As of 4th March 2008 a total of 57 responses had been received.  Further potential 
respondents were targeted directly via email using contact details available from the 
Directory of Chartered Psychologists on the British Psychological Society’s website.  This 
search resulted in a list of 1339 Chartered Clinical Psychologists who were offering their 
services to the public using this facility.  Of these, 1170 included an email address in their 
contact details.  These potential respondents were sent an email that contained the same text 
as the advert and a hypertext link to the online questionnaire.  Of these, 181 emails were 
returned as undeliverable leaving a final contactable sample of 989.  One hundred and 
twenty-six of these potential participants responded, representing a response rate of 12.7%.  
The two sets of responses (from the email and the advert) were combined to produce the final 
sample of 183 respondents, of which 125 (68.3%) answered all of the items on the MBQ and 
the single ‘knowledge of the memory literature’ item. 
Hypnotherapists (HT): These were defined as those individuals who advertised in the 
‘Hypnotherapists’ section of the Yellow Pages™ directory.  Details of everyone who 
advertised their services in this section in all 110 directories for the UK were gathered.  Their 
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details were entered into a spreadsheet and each entry was numbered separately.  To avoid 
double counting, entries were deleted if it was clear from the advert that the person was a 
Chartered Clinical Psychologist, or a member of the British Psychological Society.  This 
resulted in a total sample of 2646.  One thousand entries were then selected randomly from 
the spreadsheet using an online random number generator (www.randomizer.org).  Every 
person in this sample was then mailed a postcard advertising the study giving a web address 
for the online survey and the details of the prize draw (the wording of the advert was identical 
to the wording for the Chartered Clinical Psychologists sample).  This initial postcard was 
sent in December 2007, with two reminder postcards sent in January and February 2008.  
Forty-three postcards were returned as undeliverable resulting in a potential sample of 957.  
One hundred and nineteen online questionnaires were completed, representing a return rate of 
12.4%.  Of these 119 respondents, 88 (73.9%) answered all of the items on the MBQ and the 
single ‘knowledge of the memory literature’ item. 
Undergraduate students (UG):  The undergraduate psychology student sample (UG) 
consisted of 141 Year 1 students (24 male) attending an introductory psychology lecture 
given by the first author during their first week at University (Autumn / Fall semester 2009).  
Of these, 124 (87.9%) answered all of the items on the MBQ and the single ‘knowledge of 
the memory literature’ item. 
The following section provides the demographics and other relevant information for 
those respondents who responded to all the MBQ items as well as the ‘knowledge of the 
memory literature’ item. 
Characteristics of responders. 
Chartered Clinical Psychologists (CCP): One respondent did not indicate their 
gender.  Of the remainder there were 41 males (33%) and 83 females (66%).  One respondent 
RUNNING HEAD: LATENT VARIABLES UNDERLING MEMORY BELIEFS 
 13 
(0.8%) did not indicate their age.  For the remainder, the age of respondents was as follows: 
‘under 30 years old’ (7.2%); ‘31-40 years old’ (32.8%); ‘41-50 years old’ (22.4%), ‘51-60 
years old’ (30.4%); ‘61-70 years old’ (5.6%); and ‘over 70 years old’ (0.8%).  In terms of 
post-qualification clinical experience the responses were: ‘0-10 years’ (41.6%); ’11-20 years’ 
(20.8%); ‘21-30 years’ (21.6%); ‘over 30 years’ (16.0%).  The majority (65.6%) described 
their main orientation as ‘Cognitive-Behavioural’.  The next largest category was ‘Eclectic’ 
(29.6%), followed by ‘Systems’ (17.6%), ‘Psychodynamic’ (14.4%) and ‘Client-centred / 
Humanistic’ (8.8%).  These categories sum to more than 100 per cent because 41 respondents 
(32.8%) checked more than one orientation. 
Hypnotherapists (HT): Of the 88 responders, 36 (40.9%) were male and 52 (59.1%) 
were female.  Respondents fell into the following age brackets: ‘under 30 years old’ (1.1%); 
‘31-40 years old’ (11.4%); ’41-50 years old’ (21.6%); ‘51-60 years old’ (46.6%); ‘61-70 
years old’ (17.0%); and ‘over 71 years old’ (2.3%).  In terms of post-qualification experience 
the responses were: ‘0-10 years’ (56.8%); ‘11-20 years’ (26.1%); ‘21-30 years’ (14.8%); and 
‘over 30 years’ (2.3%).  The most endorsed therapeutic orientation was ‘Cognitive-
Behavioural’ (39.7%), followed by ‘Client-centred / humanistic’ (38.6%), ‘Eclectic’ (35.2%), 
‘Psychodynamic’ (18.2%) and ‘Systems’ (1.1%).  Again, these categories sum to more than 
100 per cent because 46 respondents (52.3%) checked more than one orientation. 
Undergraduate students (UG): Of the 124 responders, 21 (16.9%) were male and 103 
(83.1%) were female.  With the exception of one student (0.8%) who indicated that they fell 
into the ‘41-50 years old’ bracket, the entire sample reported being ‘under 30 years old’.  
While this sample was not asked to respond to questions about their post-qualification 
experience or therapeutic orientation, all 124 confirmed that they had studied some 
psychology prior to attending University. 
Responders versus non-responders 
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Of the 302 professional respondents (Clinical Psychologists and Hypnotherapists) 
who responded to the original survey, 213 (70.5%) answered all of the MBQ items and the 
‘knowledge of the memory literature’ item.  Of the 141 potential undergraduate students, 124 
(87.9%) volunteered to participate, and answered all of the MBQ items as well as the 
‘knowledge of the memory literature’ item.  There were no differences between those who 
responded and those who did not in terms of gender (% female: CCP responders 66.9% vs. 
non-responders 77.6%; HT responders 59.1% vs. HT non-responders 53.3%; UG responders 
83.1% vs. UG non-responders 82.4%, all Chi2 < 2.15, all ps > .16) or age bracket (CCP 3.93 
vs. 3.96; HT 4.73 vs. 4.53; UG 2.01 vs. 2.00, all ps > .31). CCP responders indicated that 
they had significantly more post qualification experience (M = 2.12, SD = 1.12) than non-
responders (M = 1.77, SD = 0.92), t (181) = -2.03, p = .0433. There was no difference in post 
qualification experience between HT responders (M = 1.62, 0.82) and non-responders (M = 
1.53, SD 0.14), p = .61.   
 
                                                                 
3
 Because this item required respondents to select a range bracket (e.g., 0-10 years; 11-20 years) rather than 
provide an exact number (e.g., of years) this may have led to a loss of resolution.  Thus, although statistically 
significant, we cannot determine if this difference is meaningful, or an artifact of category boundaries (i.e., the 
difference between 10 and 11 years is unlikely to be meaningful where as a difference between 0 and 20 years 
may very well be). 
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Results 
Memory Beliefs Questionnaire – item analyses 
As shown in Table 1 the subsets differed in their endorsement of the ten memory belief 
questions.  Recall that higher scores here indicate responses that are more in line with the broad 
scientific consensus.  Hypnotherapists scored lowest on six of the ten statements: that the mind is 
capable of unconsciously blocking out memories of traumatic experiences; that memory is like a 
computer, accurately recording events as they actually occurred; that it is possible for an individual 
to develop ‘false’ memories of non-traumatic events; that the more confidence with which a memory 
is reported, the more likely it is to be accurate; that early memories, from the first year of life, are 
accurately stored and retrievable; and that memory is not influenced by suggestion.  
Undergraduates scored lowest on two statements: that very vivid memories are more likely to be 
accurate than vague memories, and that the more emotion with which a memory is reported, the 
more likely it is to be accurate followed by the Hypnotherapists then the Chartered Clinical 
Psychologists.  Chartered Clinical Psychologists scored lowest on the item asking whether a poor 
memory for childhood events is indicative of a traumatic childhood, followed by the 
Hypnotherapists and the Undergraduate students.  Finally, the Chartered Clinical Psychologists 
scored highest in response to statement about whether it is possible for an individual to distinguish 
between ‘true’ and ‘false’ memories while the mean score for the Hypnotherapists and 
Undergraduates did not differ on this item. 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
In order to explore whether latent variables – in this case implicit beliefs about memory – 
could account for these responses, a Principal Components Analysis with a Varimax rotation of the 
ten memory belief items was conducted on the responses provided by all 337 respondents.  The 
Kaiser-Meyer Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was good (KMO = .76).  The resulting 
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component loadings (excluding those less than 0.4) are shown in Table 2.  Inspection of the 
loadings and the scree plot (Figure 1) suggested a three-component solution that accounted for 52% 
of the variance in the memory belief scores.   
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
Four items loaded onto the first component that we named quality ≠ accuracy.  These items 
all relate to beliefs about how the self-reported qualities of a memory relate to accuracy of that 
memory (low scores on which indicate a belief that confidence, emotion, are indicative of the 
accuracy of a memory Cronbach’s alpha = .68).  Four items loaded on the second component, that 
we named memory = malleable.  These items relate to beliefs about the malleability of memory 
(low scores on which indicate a belief that early memories are accurately stored and retrievable; that 
‘true’ and ‘false’ memories can be reliably distinguished, Cronbach’s alpha = .63).  The final 
component (that we labelled outcomes) consisted of the two items relating to a belief that false 
memories cannot occur and that ‘unconscious’ repression can occur.  As these two items were 
uncorrelated (r = -.01) and the eigenvalue was just over one (1.06), meaning that the combination of 
these two items was explaining only marginally more variance than if the two items were 
considered separately, this component was not analysed further. 
Inspecting histograms and the measures of dispersion of the resultant z scores revealed that 
the quality ≠ accuracy component was normally distributed (skew of -.026) whereas the memory = 
malleable component had moderate positive skew (skew of 1.03).  In order to test for differences 
between our samples on these components, two Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by 
ranks tests were conducted which revealed that the difference between the endorsement of the three 
groups on the quality ≠ accuracy component failed to reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance, H(2) = 5.54, p = .063.  However, as shown in Figure 2, the three groups differed in 
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their endorsement of items from the memory = malleable component H(2) = 84.44, p < .005.  
Mann-Whitney post-hoc tests (with Holm’s sequential Bonferroni-correction to p’s = .016, .025 and 
.05 for the three comparisons respectively; Holm, 1979) revealed that Hypnotherapists provided the 
lowest endorsement of these items (i.e., lower beliefs in the malleable nature of memory), followed 
by Undergraduates and Clinical Psychologists (all p’s < .005).   
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
Memory Beliefs Questionnaire – total score 
Scores on this variable had a potential range of 10 to 40 where higher scores indicated 
responses that were more in line with the scientific consensus. There were three outliers (all 
Hypnotherapists with scores of 16, 16 and 15) but no extreme values and the scores were normally 
distributed (skew = -.33; kurtosis = .10) with a mean of 29.01 (SD = 4.45).  A one-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of sample, F2, 334 = 25.71, p < .001, partial eta
2 = .134.  As shown in 
Figure 3, Scheffe post-hoc analysis revealed that Chartered Clinical Psychologists (range: 22-39) 
scored significantly higher than Hypnotherapists (range: 15-39) and Undergraduate students (range: 
20-36) (whose scores did not differ from each other). 
--- Figure 3 about here --- 
 
 
Knowledge of the memory literature  
Recall that participants were asked to rate their knowledge on a relatively crude three-point 
scale from one (‘below average’) to three (‘above average’). The median and modal responses to 
                                                                 
4
 A second ANOVA was conducted on the memory belief scores of the Chartered Clinical Psychologists and 
Hypnotherapists that included respondent age and their self-reported years of clinical practice as covariates.  The same 
main effect emerged for sample (CCP scored higher than HT; F1, 209 = 24.69, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .10) and neither 
age, nor years of experience, had any effect on the memory belief scores (both F’s < .05).  We thank an anonymous 
reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
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this statement for all three groups were both two (i.e., ‘average’) with 29.4% (n = 99) rating their 
knowledge as ‘below average’, 61.1% (n = 206) as ‘average’ and 9.5% (n = 32) as ‘above average’. 
A Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance of ranks indicated that there was a significant effect 
of group on this variable, H(2) = 38.59, p < .005 and Holm’s sequential Bonferroni-corrected (to p’s 
< .016, .025 and .05 for the three comparisons respectively; Holm, 1979) Mann Whitney tests 
indicated that all three groups differed significantly from each other (CCP vs. UG, p < .005; UG vs. 
HT, p < .005; CCP vs. HT, p < .05).  As shown in Figure 4, Undergraduates gave the lowest ratings 
(mean rank = 133.63), followed by Chartered Clinical Psychologists (mean rank = 180.03), with the 
highest ratings being provided by Hypnotherapists (mean rank = 203.17). A Spearman’s rank 
correlation revealed no relationship between respondents’ self-reported knowledge of the memory 
literature and their scores on the Memory Beliefs Questionnaire composite score (rho = .03, p = 
.62), even when each group was considered separately (all correlation coefficients < .05). 
--- Figure 4 about here --- 
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Discussion 
In light of the view that the findings of memory science simply reflect ‘common sense’ 
assumptions (Keane, 2010), the aim of this study was to examine the memory beliefs of three 
groups of respondents: Chartered Clinical Psychologists, Hypnotherapists, and undergraduate 
students.  The first finding of note was that Chartered Clinical Psychologists’ composite scores on 
the Memory Beliefs Questionnaire were more in line with the scientific consensus than either the 
Hypnotherapists, or undergraduate students.  This may be explained by the fact that Chartered 
Clinical Psychologists receive extensive professional training.  In any case, in line with many other 
surveys, these data show that beliefs about memory vary between different groups and can deviate 
markedly from the broad scientific consensus. 
The second noteworthy finding was that a Principal Component Analysis revealed two 
internally consistent components that might underlie respondents’ answers to the questionnaire 
items.  The first component (that we labelled quality ≠ accuracy) was comprised of items relating to 
the qualities of memories that might indicate their accuracy (e.g., emotion, vividness, held with 
confidence).  The three groups did not differ significantly in their endorsement of items on this 
component.  The second component (that we labelled memory = malleable) was comprised of items 
relating to the permanence of memory (e.g., memory is like a computer, early memories from the 
first year of life are possible, memories are not influenced by suggestion).  Scores on this second 
component differed significantly between all three groups with Hypnotherapists scoring the lowest, 
followed by undergraduates and then Chartered (licensed) Clinical Psychologists.  Thus, the 
Hypnotherapist group was significantly more likely to endorse the view that memories are stable 
and not vulnerable to suggestion than the comparison groups. 
These findings echo those of Patihis et al. (2014) and Niedźwieńska et al. (2007) who found 
that responses to their questionnaire items could be summarized by components relating to belief in 
memory reliability and permanence.  They also support other work that has found widespread 
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beliefs in the permanence and stability of memory (e.g., Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Garry, Loftus, 
Brown & DuBreuil, 1997; Simons & Chabris, 2011).  This finding is also reminiscent of the 
stability bias found in laboratory studies where participants believe that the accessibility of their 
own memories will remain stable over time (e.g., Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer & Bar, 2004; Kornell & 
Bjork, 2009).   
The third finding was that Hypnotherapists’ ratings of their knowledge of the memory 
literature were significantly higher than the ratings provided by Chartered Clinical Psychologists 
and undergraduate students, despite the fact that their scores on the composite Memory Beliefs 
Questionnaire were the lowest of the three groups (and significantly lower than the Chartered 
Clinical Psychologists’ scores) and, as such, reflected poorer knowledge of the relevant scientific 
literature.   
Examining responses to individual items that comprised the Memory Beliefs Questionnaire 
revealed some additional findings of note.  Firstly, 75% of the entire sample ‘strongly agreed’ with 
the statement that “the mind is capable of unconsciously blocking out memories of traumatic 
events”.  Despite decades of research, no credible evidence has been found to support this claim 
although it remains a common belief (see Garry, Loftus & Brown, 1994; Patihis, Lilienfeld, Ho & 
Loftus, 2014; Brewin & Andrews, 2014).  Although important work on motivated forgetting 
suggests that people are able to reduce the accessibility of memories of positive, negative or neutral 
words when instructed to do so, this is framed as a gradual and intentional process that “people get 
better at with practice” not “where memories are forgotten abruptly via an unconscious defence 
mechanism” (Anderson & Huddleston, 2011, p. 109; Garry & Loftus, 2004).  McNally (2003) has 
argued that the notion that the mind protects by unconsciously repressing memories “rendering 
them inaccessible to awareness, is a piece of psychiatric folklore devoid of convincing empirical 
support” (p. 275).  
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So what might explain the finding that 75% of the sample ‘strongly agreed’ that repression 
can occur?  Firstly, the notion of unconscious repression is reinforced in countless books, television 
shows, films and popular psychology books.  Although memory science has proposed a number of 
relatively mundane explanations of such experiences based on well established memory phenomena 
that do not require a ‘repression’ mechanism (McNally, 2012; McNally & Geraerts, 2009) this 
evidence may not be powerful enough to counteract such a powerful cultural ‘meme’.  Secondly, 
our questionnaire did not probe beliefs about frequency or likelihood of phenomena.  In other words 
we do not know from the current data whether respondents thought that repression is possible in 
principle, but might be an extremely rare or extremely common occurrence.  Thirdly, although the 
wording of the question referred to ‘unconsciously blocking out memories,’ it is possible that this 
distinction was not obvious or relevant to respondents, and that their responses instead reflected 
their belief in intentional, motivated, forgetting or indeed other – more colloquial – understandings 
of the term ‘repression’ (i.e., ‘not thinking’ about something).  Further research is clearly warranted 
about what it is that people understand by the term ‘repression’ although this is unlikely to lead to a 
clear resolution (see Garry, Loftus & Brown, 1994 for a discussion). 
Secondly, in addition to the high rate of endorsement of a repression mechanism, there was 
evidence of some ‘risky’ beliefs (Poole et al., 1995) amongst the Hypnotherapist group with 24% of 
those respondents ‘strongly agreeing’ that memories from the first year of life are accurately stored 
and retrievable (15.1% of the sample reported by Patihis et al., 2014, responded that people can, 
with effort, remember events back to birth).  Although there is certainly strong evidence that very 
young infants can ‘remember’ events (Bauer & Leventon, 2013), there is also evidence that such 
memories do not survive in a way that means they are retrievable in adulthood (Bauer & Larkina, 
2014).  In addition, just under one fifth of the Hypnotherapist group (17%) ‘strongly agreed’ that 
memory accurately ‘records’ events as they occurred, counter to decades of research providing 
evidence to the contrary.  The evidence of such ‘risky’ beliefs (e.g., that memories from the first 
RUNNING HEAD: LATENT VARIABLES UNDERLING MEMORY BELIEFS 
 22 
year of life are accurately stored and retrievable) was tempered somewhat by the finding that just 
over half of the sample (51%) ‘strongly agreed’ that false memories of non-traumatic events are 
possible. 
This survey was motivated partly by the claim that the findings of memory science may 
simply reflect common sense (Keane, 2010).  Our novel findings relating to the beliefs of UK 
Chartered Clinical Psychologists and individuals who advertise their services as Hypnotherapists, 
along with other similar studies on diverse samples of professionals and non-professionals, indicate 
that this is not the case.  In our sample, Chartered Clinical Psychologists answered the Memory 
Beliefs Questionnaire in a way that was most consistent with the findings of memory science.  
However, the findings also suggest that many practitioners would proffer opinions orthogonal to, or 
in direct contradiction to, the findings of the memory literature (e.g., in relation to the accessibility 
of memories from the first year of life, or earlier; see Rowan, 2014).  There are two primary causes 
for concern that relate to how such evidence might enter the criminal justice system.  Firstly, 
although they could not testify as opinion experts in UK courts, they would nevertheless be allowed 
to testify as witnesses to fact about what their clients could (or could not) remember at any given 
point in time.  Thus – in the case of the current sample – roughly one quarter would give 
unwarranted credence to memories that are claimed to be from the first year of life and may 
communicate this misunderstanding to their clients and thus, indirectly, to the courts.  Secondly, 
they may have had a strong influence over the genesis and development of memory claims by 
communicating their (mis)understanding of memory phenomena to their clients (i.e., that adults’ 
reports of memories from a very young age are likely to be reliable, or that they could have 
unconsciously ‘repressed’ memories).  To their clients, at least, they are likely to be viewed as 
experts (Dawes, 1994).  Thus, misconceptions about memory may have been communicated to a 
client long before a report is made to the police, or the case reaches court.  The court is then left 
with the task of trying to untangle reliable from unreliable aspects of recollections.  As a result, the 
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evidence of genuine victims of abuse may then be viewed as less reliable than it would have been 
had no inappropriate therapeutic intervention taken place. 
As with any survey, there are some limitations that should be acknowledged.  Firstly, the 
self-reports about memory knowledge were taken after respondents had given their answers to the 
questionnaire items.  Thus, these ratings are likely to have been affected by the difficulty that 
respondents had in answering those questions. Had respondents’ ratings of their knowledge of the 
literature been consistently influenced by their perceptions of how easily they had answered the 
memory questions then one might have expected this to be emerge as a positive correlation between 
their answers to the Memory Belief items, and their self-reported knowledge of the scientific 
literature on memory.  No such correlations emerged.  It is also possible that Hypnotherapists did 
indeed read lots of literature about memory, but that it was not particularly scientific literature.   
Secondly, the original survey (in which the Memory Belief items were embedded) had a 
response rate of around 12%.  However, this rate does not deviate markedly from the response rates 
in other similar surveys (15.5%, Patihis et al., 2014; 13%, Wise, Safer & Maro, 2011) and some of 
the respondents’ characteristics were representative of the populations from which they were drawn 
(Ost et al., 2013).  Finally, the measure used to assess self-reported knowledge of the scientific 
literature (adapted from Yapko, 1994) had a limited range (1-3) and therefore may not have been 
particularly sensitive to variation.  It is noteworthy that differences between the three groups 
emerged, even with this relatively crude measure.   
Thirdly, these data were collected in 2007-08 (Clinical Psychologists & Hypnotherapists) 
and 2009 (Undergraduates).  It is of course possible that memory beliefs change over time.  
However, the key finding of the present study – that groups could be differentiated based on their 
latent beliefs regarding the malleability (or otherwise) of memory – replicates findings published 
around the same time as these data were collected (Niedźwieńska et al., 2007) as well as data 
published more recently (Patihis et al., 2014).  Fourthly, to aid comprehension, many of the MBQ 
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items were keyed in the same direction.  The disadvantage of doing this is that it may have 
introduced a bias in participants’ responses.  Any future work would need to correct this potential 
source of bias.  Finally, with the benefit of hindsight, it would have been useful to compare the 
present findings to ‘common sense’ groups (i.e., those without any psychological training, like the 
general public) as well as to a group of memory experts (e.g., Kassin, Tubb, Hosch & Memon, 
2001) or those who serve as expert witnesses in court (e.g., Melinder & Magnussen, 2014).   
What do these findings mean for the practice of expert witnesses presenting memory 
evidence at court?  An expert witness is somebody who can present to the court scientific or 
technical information that is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury 
and the judge determines whether such a witness is competent to give evidence as an expert in any 
given case.  The findings of the present survey suggest that Hypnotherapists may be unlikely to be 
reliable guides to memory science – they had the lowest scores on the memory belief scale but the 
highest confidence in their own knowledge of the memory literature.  The Hypnotherapists were 
also more likely to endorse ‘risky’ beliefs (e.g., that memories from the first year of life are 
accurately stored and retrievable; memory is an accurate record of events).  The current findings 
also suggest that some beliefs about memory science persist, even among highly trained and 
experienced Clinical Psychologists, which would be at odds with the consensus academic view 
among researchers in the field (e.g., that the mind is capable of unconsciously blocking out 
memories of trauma).  Thus in cases involving complex memory phenomena, it may be more 
appropriate to consider seeking the evidence of an expert specializing in memory science, at the 
pre-court and police investigation stages and in court. 
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Table 1. Total and individual mean endorsement scores for, and total and individual % samples that ‘strongly agreed’ (SA) with, the ten memory statements. 
 CCP x̅ (SE) 
(n = 125) 
% SA (n) HT x̅ (SE) 
(n = 88) 
% SA (n) UG x̅ (SE) 
(n = 124) 
% SA (n) Total x̅ (SE) 
(N = 337) 
Total %SA 
The mind is capable of unconsciously ‘blocking out’ 
memories of traumatic events. 
1.36 (.05) 69.6 (87) 1.13 (.04) 88.6 (78) 1.33 (.05) 70.2 (87) 1.29 (.03) 74.8 
Memory is like a computer, accurately recording events 
as they actually occurred. 
3.78 (.04) 0.0 (0) 2.67 (.11) 17.0 (15) 3.09 (.08) 5.6 (7) 3.24 (.05) 6.5 
It is possible for an individual to develop ‘false’ 
memories of non-traumatic events. 
3.48 (.06) 54.4 (68) 3.30 (.09) 47.7 (42) 3.37 (.06) 51.6 (64) 3.40 (.04) 51.6 
Very vivid memories are more likely to be accurate than 
vague memories. 
2.92 (.07) 3.2 (4) 2.63 (.10) 14.8 (13) 2.20 (.07) 21.8 (27) 2.58 (.05) 13.1 
A poor memory for childhood events is indicative of a 
traumatic childhood. 
3.00 (.08) 2.4 (3) 3.10 (.10) 5.7 (5) 3.15 (.07) 2.4 (3) 3.08 (.05) 3.3 
The more confidence with which a memory is reported, 
the more likely it is to be accurate. 
3.05 (.07) 0.0 (0) 2.77 (.09) 6.8 (6) 2.99 (.07) 1.6 (2) 2.95 (.04) 2.4 
Early memories, from the first year of life, are accurately 
stored and retrievable. 
3.61 (.05) 0.0 (0) 2.44 (.11) 23.9 (21) 2.97 (.06) 1.6 (2) 3.07 (.05) 6.8 
Memory is not influenced by suggestion. 
 
3.79 (.05) 2.4 (3) 3.44 (.09) 6.8 (6) 3.67 (.05) 5.6 (7) 3.65 (.04) 2.7 
It is possible for an individual to distinguish between 
‘true’ and ‘false’ memories . 
2.96 (.06) 2.4 (3) 2.84 (.10) 10.2 (9) 2.84 (.07) 3.2 (4) 2.88 (.04) 4.7 
The more emotion with which a memory is reported, the 
more likely it is to be accurate. 
3.08 (.07) 1.6 (2) 2.81 (.10) 11.4 (10) 2.62 (.07) 10.5 (13) 2.83 (.05) 7.4 
Notes: CCP = Chartered Clinical Psychologist, HT = Hypnotherapist, UG = Year one undergraduate Psychologist.  A higher score indicates endorsement of that item that is 
in line with the scientific consensus.  SE = standard error.  Bold font indicates group(s) with the lowest mean score on each item. 
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Table 2. Varimax rotated component loadings for the ten memory belief items. 
Component 1 
Quality ≠ accuracy 
2 
Memory = malleable 
3 
Outcomes 
The more emotion with which a memory is reported, the more likely it is to be accurate .759   
The more confidence with which a memory is reported, the more likely it is to be accurate. .749   
Very vivid memories are more likely to be accurate than vague memories. .727   
A poor memory for childhood events is indicative of a traumatic childhood .536   
Memory is like a computer, accurately recording events as they actually occurred.  .785  
Early memories, from the first year of life, are accurately stored and retrievable.  .710  
Memory is not influenced by suggestion.  .695  
It is possible for an individual to distinguish between ‘true’ and ‘false’ memories   .440  
The mind is capable of unconsciously ‘blocking out’ memories of traumatic events.   .802 
It is possible for an individual to develop ‘false’ memories of non-traumatic events.   -.411 
Eigenvalue 2.16 2.02 1.06 
% total variance 21.63 20.24 10.68 
Note. Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization.  Three components extracted.  Four iterations required.  
Component loadings below .4 were suppressed. 
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Figure 1. Scree plot of eigenvalues from Principal Component Analysis. 
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Figure 2. Mean z scores of the three groups on the Quality ≠ accuracy and Memory = malleable components (error 
bars show 95% CIs). 
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Figure 3. Mean scores of the three groups on the Memory Beliefs Questionnaire (error bars show 95% CIs).  
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Figure 4. Mean scores of the three groups on the self-reported knowledge of the memory literature item (error bars 
show 95% CIs). 
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